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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the impact of liberal-conservative ideology on voting behavior in
the 2004 presidential election. The analysis uses data from the CPS National Election Study
for that year. The empirical results show that liberal-conservative identifications exerted no
direct impact on voting choices within the 2004 electorate. However, there was widespread
recognition of the candidates’ and parties’ ideological positions. And, liberal-conservative
identifications did show an indirect effect which operated through their influence on the more
proximate determinants of electoral decisions. These findings clarify the role of ideology in
the 2004 presidential election; they also conform very closely to the basic theoretical structure
laid out in The American Voter.
This paper examines the role of ideology as a determinant of recent voting behavior in
the American electorate. The analysis uses data from the 2004 CPS National Election Study,
and the empirical results suggest a somewhat complicated interpretation. On the one hand,
liberal-conservative orientations had no direct impact whatsoever on citizens’ voting choices.
On the other hand, mass perceptions and evaluations of the candidates, issues, and conditions
within the external environment were clearly structured along ideological lines. And, the
latter did influence electoral decisions. Therefore, liberal-conservative ideology exerted an
important, but completely indirect, effect on citizens’ 2004 voting choices. These findings
have important implications, not only for understanding the role of ideology in American
elections, but also for theories of voting behavior.
BACKGROUND
Over the years, scholars of mass political behavior have treated ideology in two differ-
ent ways. One perspective, drawn from The American Voter and Philip Converse’s (1964;
1970; 1975) seminal studies of citizens’ belief systems, stresses the weak effects of liberal-
conservative orientations, due to cognitive limitations within the electorate and the resultant
general inability (or unwillingness) to deal with ideological abstractions (Kinder 1983). The
alternative perspective emphasizes that many people make electoral decisions which are con-
sistent with their own liberal-conservative identifications, even if they use these labels in a
non-ideological manner (e.g., Levitin and Miller 1979)
Efforts to reconcile these two potentially contradictory views of ideology have also pro-
ceeded along two somewhat different paths. First, a number of scholars have shown that
there are pronounced individual differences within the electorate in terms of the propensity
to view the world through a liberal-conservative lens. Stated simply, some people orga-
nize their attitudes and behavior along ideological lines while others do not (e.g., Jacoby
1986; 1988; 1991). The former comprise a fairly small subset of the overall public, generally
well-educated and relatively involved with the political world. Second, researchers have also
emphasized that liberal-conservative labels have affective value in themselves even if they
are not reflections of a coherent, underlying ideology (e.g., Conover and Feldman 1981). In
this latter capacity, personal attachments to “liberal” or “conservative” still enable people to
sort the political world into “us” and “them,” and thereby serve as a useful heuristic device
for making electoral decisions (Sears, Lau, Tyler, Allen 1980; Sears 1993).
Combining the preceding two lines of research, the current consensus seems to be that
ideological themes are relatively pervasive within American public opinion. But, the affective
content of liberal-conservative terms predominates at lower levels of political sophistication,
while their utility as cognitive structuring mechanisms comes to the forefront among more
knowledgeable people (Sniderman, Brody, Tetlock 1991). In any event, political scientists
have generally regarded ideology as a major influence on voting behavior in recent presi-
dential elections even though the psychological mechanisms underlying its impact may vary
across strata within the mass public (e.g., Knight 1985; Alvarez and Nagler 1995; 1998;
Miller and Shanks 1996).
The campaign rhetoric manifested during the 2004 election period did not particularly
focus on ideological themes. But, four years of Bush administration’s aggressively conser-
vative policy initiatives, combined with the Kerry organization’s overt attempt to mobilize
traditionally liberal constituencies, made it very easy for people to sort out the relative ide-
ological positions associated with the two presidential candidates. And, it seems reasonable
to expect that this clarity would be reflected in the ways that citizens reached their voting
decisions.
DATA
Note that the objective of this analysis is not to construct a detailed representation of
the precise causal structure underlying individual vote choice. Instead, it is to summarize in
a parsimonious manner the effects of several variables which have been featured prominently
in substantive theories of mass political behavior or which reflect salient elements of the 2004
campaign environment. Of course, we will pay particular attention to the impact of citizens’
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liberal-conservative orientations, relative to the other hypothesized influences on electoral
decisions.
Fortunately, the 2004 CPS National Election Study provides exactly the kind of informa-
tion required to examine the impact of ideology on voting behavior in that year’s presidential
election. The dependent variable for the analysis is each individual’s choice between George
W. Bush and John Kerry. Although Ralph Nader received quite a bit of publicity as a
third-party candidate, he attracted very little electoral support. There is only a tiny handful
of Nader voters among the 2004 NES respondents and they are simply omitted from this
portion of the analysis.1 Therefore, the dependent variable is a dichotomy, with Bush voters
coded one and Kerry voters coded zero.
The independent variables are divided into three subsets composed of two variables each.
First, and most relevant to the present study, there are long-term symbolic predispositions.
Party identification and Liberal-conservative self-placement both develop early in life, as
the first real consequences of the general political socialization process. From there, they
serve as relatively stable “platforms” for evaluating more transitory political stimuli. Party
identification is almost universally regarded as a group attachment. As explained earlier,
ideological self-placements could work in several different ways. But, regardless of the exact
process, it will be the major focus of attention below. Both of these variables are measured
using the standard seven-point scales that have been included in the NES interview schedules
for many years; they are coded so that larger values indicate stronger Republican/more
extreme conservative identifications.
The second subset of variables is composed of two relatively proximal political influences
on voting choice: Comparative evaluations of the candidates’ personality traits and sum-
maries of individual issue stands. Both of these variables are operationalized as multiple- item
scales. The personality assessment measure is obtained from the NES respondents’ beliefs
about the degrees to which Bush and Kerry possessed seven personality traits.2 Specifically,
the response scores are recoded so that larger values indicate more positive evaluations. Each
3
respondent’s mean score (i.e., across the seven traits) for Kerry is subtracted from his/her
mean score for Bush. The resultant scale is highly reliable (Cronbach’s alpha is 0.906) and
it summarizes the degree to which people believe that Bush possesses more desirable person-
ality characteristics than Kerry. The measure of issue attitudes is obtained by taking each
respondent’s mean score across the seven-point issue scales included in the pre-election wave
of the 2004 NES.3 Again, the scale is very reliable, with an Alpha coefficient of 0.740. It is
coded so that higher scores indicate more conservative issue stands.
The third subset of variables taps individual retrospective evaluations. One variable
measures assessments of the Iraq war, using a summated rating scale constructed from two
items (Cronbach’s Alpha equals 0.647).4 The other variable summarizes sociotropic eco-
nomic judgments, by combining responses to questions about whether the national economy,
inflation, and unemployment had gotten better or worse over the preceding year (Alpha
equals 0.752). Both of these scales are coded so that larger values indicate more optimistic
judgments about conditions in the respective contexts.
IDEOLOGY AND VOTE CHOICE IN 2004
Let us begin with a relatively simple model which tests the direct effects on vote choice
in 2004. Table 1 shows the maximum likelihood coefficients, standard errors, and odds
ratios obtained when the six independent variables are used to predict voting for George W.
Bush in a logistic regression model. The equation fits the data very well, with a pseudo-
R2 value of 0.778. As one might expect from such a good fit, most of the independent
variables have coefficients that are statistically different from zero, in the expected directions.
Personality assessments have the strongest impact, by far: A single unit increase in preference
for Bush’s traits over Kerry’s traits corresponds to a nearly eightfold increase in the odds of
a Bush vote. Issue attitudes have the second-strongest effect, with a single unit movement
in the conservative direction doubling the odds of a Bush vote. Sociotropic judgments, party
identification, and feelings about the Iraq war all have smaller, but still significant, effects.
A single-unit, pro-incumbent difference on any of these variables (i.e., more positive about
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the economy and/or the war, more Republican identification) increases the odds of a Bush
vote by a magnitude that ranges from about 43% (for feelings about Iraq) to about 78% (for
retrospective economic judgments).
For present purposes, the most important result involves the one independent variable
in Table 1 with a nonsignificant impact: Liberal-conservative identification. The maximum
likelihood coefficient estimate for this variable is positive (as expected), but it is quite small
(0.247) relative to both its standard error (0.188) and the coefficients for the two other
seven-point scales included in the equation (i.e., 0.756 for the issue attitude variable and
0.510 for party identification). A one-unit movement in the conservative direction along
the ideological continuum only corresponds to a 28% increase in the odds of a Bush vote.
Thus, it appears that liberal-conservative self-placements do not exert a direct influence on
individuals’ 2004 voting choices.
The null result for ideology is intriguing not only because of the general prominence of
this variable in theories of mass behavior, but also because the conceptually similar variables
measuring party identification and personal issue stands both exert clearcut and fairly strong
effects on electoral decisions. So, an obvious question arises: Why is ideology different?
One possible answer to that question might be that individual differences are “masking”
the impact of ideology. This could occur if a large stratum of nonideological voters coexists
with a relatively small ideologically oriented subset within the electorate. In that case, the
net effect of liberal-conservative placements might appear to be negligible, even though they
are highly important for certain people.
This latter possibility can be tested by estimating a conditional effects model which allows
the impact of the six explanatory variables to differ across levels of political sophistication.
In the NES data, sophistication can be measured by counting up the number of correct
answers that each respondent gives to six factual questions about American politics.5 This
political knowledge index is used to create six multiplicative terms by taking its product
with each of the other independent variables.
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Table 2 presents the maximum likelihood estimates for a logistic regression model that
includes the original explanatory variables, the knowledge index, and the multiplicative terms
between them. The leftmost column shows the coefficients for the six variables– these are
their effects at the lowest sophistication level (i.e., when the knowledge index is equal to
zero). The right-hand column gives the coefficients for the respective multiplicative terms.
These give the difference in the impact of each explanatory variable that coincides with
movement from the minimum to the maximum value on the knowledge variable.
The results in Table 2 show that the influences on voting choice do not change across levels
of political sophistication. All six multiplicative terms have small, nonsignificant coefficients.
Overall, allowing for variation across political sophistication strata within the electorate does
not improve predictions of voting choice: Comparing the conditional-effects model in Table
2 to the original equation from Table 1 produces a likelihood ratio chi-square statistic of
5.95. With seven degrees of freedom, the observed probability value for this test is 0.545;
thus, the null hypothesis of no difference between the two models cannot be rejected.
Clearly, the lack of liberal-conservative influence on voting choice is uniform throughout
the 2004 electorate. It simply is not the case that a small subset of ideologically-attuned
people are being “masked” by a larger nonideological group of citizens. So, again, it remains
important to determine why this occurs.
IDEOLOGY IN THE 2004 CAMPAIGN ENVIRONMENT
Elections involve an interactive relationship between political elites and the mass pub-
lic. Citizen behavior reflects the kinds of stimuli that are prominent within the external
campaign environment. This general observation is relevant to the present context because,
as mentioned earlier, ideological rhetoric was not especially prominent in 2004. Therefore,
people may have not been thinking about the candidates and parties in liberal-conservative
terms. And, if that were the case, there would definitely be no reason to expect ideologically
motivated voting choices.
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Table 3 presents some data that are relevant to this point. The leftmost column of the
table shows the percentage of the NES respondents who were willing to place each of the
candidates and the two major parties along the liberal-conservative continuum. Obviously,
most people had little difficulty doing so: For Bush, Kerry, and the two major parties, the
figures hover consistently around 90%. Even for the relatively unfamiliar figure of Ralph
Nader, almost two- thirds of the respondents were able to come up with a position along the
ideological dimension.
Of course, willingness to place the candidates/parties is only the first step. Because
of the potential for rationalization of personal issue positions and/or simple acquiescence
among the survey respondents, it is not unreasonable to question the substantive validity of
the ideological placements. Therefore, the second and third columns of Table 3 report the
percentages of the NES respondents who placed each candidate or party within the “correct”
and “incorrect” regions of the seven-point liberal-conservative scale, respectively.6 For the
more familiar political figures, the percentages, again, suggest fairly widespread willingness
to use these abstractions in order to describe the candidates and parties. Slightly less than
two-thirds of the NES respondents placed Bush, Kerry, the Democratic party, and/or the
Republican party at appropriate positions along the ideological dimension, while 10-15%
located them at positions that would generally be considered incorrect. Again, the figures
are much lower for Nader: About 40% placed him on the liberal side, while just under 10%
considered him to be a conservative.
Overall, people appear to be quite adept at using an ideological dimension to describe the
relative stands of the major parties and their candidates in 2004. Sizable majorities placed
Democratic stimuli on the liberal side, and Republican figures on the conservative side of
the bipolar continuum. The results are less clearcut for Ralph Nader. But, that is entirely
reasonable, given the lack of publicity and generally idiosyncratic nature of his candidacy.
The results so far show that people can identify ideological positions for the parties and
candidates when they are specifically asked to do so. However, such questions might be
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invoking a judgmental standard that people can recognize, but do not actually use on their
own. In order to guard against this possibility, it is important to determine how the 2004
electorate thought about the candidates without or “priming” or encouraging the use of
specific evaluative dimensions. In other words, what kind of “mental maps” or cognitive
structures do people bring to bear on the political world and– more to the point– are they
organized along liberal-conservative lines?
Multidimensional scaling (MDS) is an analytic strategy that is ideally suited for dealing
with these questions. Speaking generally, MDS represents dissimilarities among a set of
stimuli as distances between points in a space. Similar stimuli are represented by points
that are located close together; dissimilar stimuli are shown as points that are more widely
separated. The objective of the MDS is to obtain a low-dimensioned configuration of points
that accurately reflects all pairwise dissimilarities between the stimulus objects (once again,
in the sense that greater dissimilarity corresponds to greater distance). The advantages of
MDS in the present context are that it (1) provides an empirical estimate of the cognitive map
that the electorate brings to bear on the candidates; and (2) it does so without any advance
specification of, or restriction on, the evaluative criteria that people employ. Therefore, if
ideology does serve to structure public perceptions, it should be apparent in the arrangement
of points that is recovered from the MDS.
The input data for the MDS are contained in a matrix of perceptual dissimilarities, cre-
ated from the feeling thermometer battery in the pre-election wave of the 2004 NES, using
the line-of-sight (LOS) methodology developed by Rabinowitz (1976). Basically, this ap-
proach assumes that people use the thermometer ratings to respond to the candidates in a
manner that is consistent with a spatial model; that is, a high thermometer score indicates
that the person is relatively “close” to that candidate, and vice versa for low scores. The
LOS procedure uses the geometric implications derived from this assumption to develop a
rank-ordered set of dissimilarities between all pairs of the candidates, using the full set of
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thermometer ratings (i.e., across all NES respondents and all candidates included in the
battery).
The MDS of the LOS dissimilarities reveals that two dimensions are sufficient to provide
a very accurate model of the public’s general beliefs about the candidates and parties. Figure
1 shows the “map” of perceived candidate and party points.7 This point configuration fits
the data perfectly, in the sense that the rank correlation between the input dissimilarities
and the scaled interpoint distances is 1.00. Thus, citizens’ perceptions of major figures in
the 2004 political world conform to a fairly simple underlying structure.
For substantive meaning of the scaling results is determined by any systematic patterns
that exist within the point configuration. Here, the most significant feature is that the
horizontal direction within the space does correspond to a general ideological dimension.
Points representing more liberal stimuli (e.g., Kerry, Edwards, Bill and Hillary Clinton, the
Democratic party, and Ralph Nader) are located near the left side, while conservative stimuli
(Ashcroft, Cheney, George Bush, and the Republican party) correspond to points near the
right side of the space. The points near the center (of the horizontal direction) represent
figures that appeal to either a nonpartisan or bipartisan constituency (i.e., Laura Bush, John
McCain, and Colin Powell).
In order to verify this ideological interpretation of citizens’ perceptions, the best strategy
is to see whether an external measure of each figure’s liberal-conservative position can be
embedded within the space. Unfortunately, the NES did not have respondents place most
of these figures along an ideological scale. Therefore, an indirect indicator must be used:
The difference between the mean feeling thermometer rating provided by liberals minus the
mean feeling thermometer rating provided by conservatives. This mean value is calculated
for each of the candidates and parties included in the MDS configuration. The differences
in the mean values should summarize ideologically based variability in citizens’ reactions
toward those stimuli.
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The multiple correlation between the MDS point coordinates and the candidate-party
ideology measure is extremely large, at 0.958. So, this systematic analysis confirms the
visual evidence: Citizens’ perceptions of the 2004 candidates and parties were fully consistent
with liberal-conservative distinctions.8 This result is particularly telling, because the NES
respondents were not explicitly instructed to use ideological criteria in their evaluations.
Instead, they apparently do so without any outside prompting.
In summary, the empirical results presented in this section provide a negative answer to
the question motivating this part of the analysis: The lack of direct ideological influence on
2004 voting choices is not due to any lack of ideological content in the political environment
or to any public inability to recognize this content. Most people locate the candidates
and parties accurately along the liberal-conservative continuum when they are asked to
do so. And, their overall perceptions of these figures also appear to be structured along
ideological lines. Thus, the external political environment in 2004 certainly could have
sustained ideological voting; it is necessary to look elsewhere to determine why it did not
occur within the electorate.
PERSONAL IDEOLOGY AND OTHER POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS
Individual predispositions like party identification and liberal-conservative ideology are
particularly important because they develop early and remain very stable throughout a
person’s life (Sears 1983; Krosnick 1991; Sears and Funk 1999). In this capacity, they shape
other political orientations that develop in response to more transitory and/or temporary
stimuli like policy issues, the candidates in any specific election, and retrospective judgments
about socioeconomic conditions. And, in so doing, partisanship and ideology could exert an
indirect effect on voting choices; this would, of course, qualify the negative results reported
earlier about the relationship between ideology and the vote. Alternatively, if people do
not make the connection between their own liberal-conservative positions and their feelings
about candidates, issues, and external conditions, then the null effects of ideology on voting
choice are perfectly reasonable. In either case, it is important to examine the impact of
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long-term predispositions– especially ideology– on the other factors that feed into individual
electoral decisions.
The empirical tests for indirect effects are provided in Table 4. Specifically, the table
shows OLS estimates from four regression equations which measure the impact of party
identification and liberal-conservative self-placement on each of the four other predictor
variables from the voting model tested back in Table 1: The summary scale of issue attitudes;
relative assessments of the presidential candidates’ personality traits, judgments about the
national economy, and reactions to the Iraq war.
Let us begin by considering the two retrospective assessments. The equation for so-
ciotropic judgments shows a relatively weak fit to the data, with an R2 value of 0.265. Of
the two independent variables, only party identification shows a significant influence. Ap-
parently, partisan affiliations shape individual views about the quality of economic life, but
liberal-conservative orientations do not serve in a similar capacity. The model fit is better
for Iraq war judgments: The R2 for this equation is 0.414. And, the coefficients for the
two independent variables are statistically significant. Both partisanship and ideology affect
individual reactions to the war in Iraq, although the magnitude of the former’s impact is
about double that of the latter.
Next, consider the two more proximate political influences on voting, issue attitudes and
judgments about candidate personality traits. Here, both equations fit quite well, with
R2 values of 0.584 and 0.428, respectively. And, the coefficients for party identification
and ideological self-placement are both statistically different from zero (in the expected
direction) in each case. Partisanship has a much stronger effect than ideology on personality
assessments. This is probably to be expected, since the candidates are representatives of
their respective parties and they largely downplayed ideological stands during the campaign.
On the other hand, the impact of liberal-conservative orientation on issue attitudes is just
as strong as (in fact, slightly stronger than) that of party identification. Ideology does join
partisanship in leading people to adopt particular policy stands.
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It is important to emphasize that the overall magnitude of ideology’s indirect effect is
quite pronounced. A single unit increase on the liberal-conservative variable operates through
the various intervening factors to produce a total indirect effect of 0.614.9 Stated differently,
it increases the odds of a vote for George W. Bush by 84.8%. To place these figures into
perspective, the indirect impact of ideology on voting choice is comparable to (and, in fact,
slightly larger) than the point estimate for the direct effect of party identification (i.e., the
coefficient of 0.510 back in Table 1).10 Thus, there was a definite ideological component in
the behavior of the 2004 electorate.
The results presented in this section show that people employ ideological considerations
in their political reasoning. Hence, the null findings reported earlier clearly are not due to
any inability on the part of the electorate to relate liberal-conservative abstractions to their
own political preferences. Instead, it is simply that ideology had an indirect, rather than
direct, effect on voting choices in 2004.
CONCLUSIONS
This analysis shows that ideology played a critical role in the 2004 presidential election.
The mass public perceived the stimuli associated with the election– candidates, parties, and
issues– in explicitly ideological terms. And, individuals’ evaluations of those stimuli were
shaped by their personal liberal-conservative orientations. At the same time, however, there
is an important caveat that qualifies the preceding interpretation: Once feelings about salient
electoral objects are taken into account, ideology had no discernible additional impact of its
own on voting choices.
Such seemingly ambiguous findings with respect to ideology might be construed as a bit
disappointing and anticlimactic. Certainly, they provide a sharp contrast to presidential
elections from the 1970s through the 1990s, in which ideological identifications did exert
separate and direct influences on voting, at least within some segments of the American
public (e.g., Miller, Miller, Raine, Brown 1976; Miller and Levitin 1976; Knight 1985; Alvarez
and Nagler 1995; 1998; Miller and Shanks 1996). At the same time, however, the findings
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obtained here are virtually identical to those reported in a similar analysis of the 2000
election (Jacoby 2004). The features of that earlier contest were quite different from the
2004 presidential election.11 So, it seems inappropriate to attribute the lack of a direct
structural relationship between ideology and vote choice to any specific circumstances that
happened to exist in 2004.
An alternative, and perhaps more constructive, interpretation is that citizens are actu-
ally using their liberal-conservative orientations as ideologies rather than as heuristic devices
which merely provide a shortcut to an electoral decision. The basic definition of “ideology”
involves a vision of the ideal society, along with the means of achieving it (Downs 1957;
Hinich and Munger 1994). Operating in this capacity, a personal ideology should provide
useful standards for assessing the leadership potential of public figures, weighing the relative
merits of alternative policy positions, and evaluating current social, political, and economic
problems. The current analysis shows that this is exactly how liberal-conservative identi-
fications operated within the 2004 electorate: They played a prominent role in structuring
individual judgments about the candidates’ personal characteristics, a variety of political is-
sues, and the state of the national economy. In other words, liberal-conservative orientations
gave people a set of criteria for interpreting the world around them. But, that is precisely
what a true ideology is supposed to do!
From this perspective, the lack of a direct ideological effect on voting choice is not partic-
ularly troubling. Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991) argue that ideological identifications
can function in both cognitive and affective capacities. In 2004, it simply appears that the
cognitive applications of liberal-conservative terms surpassed their utility as affective sym-
bols. Liberal-conservative thinking helped the electorate to organize the salient stimuli of the
2004 campaign environment in a coherent manner. After evaluating the candidates, issues,
and prevailing conditions, citizens were able to reach their voting decisions without having
to rely upon additional guidance from descriptive labels like “liberal” and “ conservative.”
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In conclusion, it is important to point out that the findings reported here are perfectly
consistent with the theoretical perspective derived from The American Voter. According
to Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1960), broad predispositions like party iden-
tification and ideology exist among the background factors that feed into an individual’s
electoral decision. But, their impact occurs largely by shaping the more immediate variables
that impinge on that decision. This is exactly what we observed in the current analysis:
Liberal-conservative identifications affected voting entirely through their influence on the
perspectives that people brought to bear on the salient stimuli of the 2004 election. In this
manner, the empirical results not only underscore the truly ideological nature of the 2004
presidential election; they also provide important confirmatory evidence to support a gen-
eral theory that has, for nearly five decades, occupied the central position within scholarly
interpretations of mass political behavior.
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NOTES
1. Of the 822 NES respondents who reported voting for president in 2004, only four, or about
0.5% voted for Nader.
2. The NES respondents were asked how well each of the following traits described Bush and
Kerry: moral; provides strong leadership; really cares about people like me; knowledgeable;
intelligent; dishonest; can’t make up his own mind. Responses are scored on a 4-point scale,
with larger values indicating stronger belief that the specified trait describes the candidate
well.
3. The summary issue scale combined responses to questions asking about: government spend-
ing versus services; defense spending; government versus private health insurance; govern-
ment guaranteed jobs and standard of living; aid to Blacks; tradeoffs between the environ-
ment and jobs; and women’s role in society.
4. The NES respondents were asked “Taking everything into account, do you think the war
in Iraq has been worth the cost or not?” and “As a result of the United States military
action in Iraq, do you think the threat of terrorism against the United States has increased,
decreased, or stayed about the same?”
5. The NES respondents were asked which party had the most members in the U.S. House of
Representatives and the U.S. Senate prior to the 2004 elections and they were also asked
to identify the offices held by Dennis Hastert, Richard Cheney, Tony Blair, and William
Rehnquist.
6. In this context, Kerry, Nader and the Democratic Party are all considered to be liberal stim-
uli. So, a correct placement in those cases would be scores of one, two, or three on the NES
seven-point scale; an incorrect placement would be scores of five, six, or seven. This scoring
scheme is reversed for the two conservative stimuli, Bush and the Republican Party.
7. The multidimensional scaling analysis was carried out using the PROC MDS routine in SAS.
However, virtually identical results are obtained when other software is used, including the
ALSCAL and PROXSCALE routines in SPSS, the multidimensional scaling routine in SY-
STAT 11, and the isoMDS function in the MASS package of the R statistical computing
environment.
8. Although not of central importance for the present analysis, the vertical dimension in Figure
1 also seems to have a fairly clear interpretation: Notice that the points representing Ralph
Nader and John McCain are both located at relatively high positions within the space (the
former much more so than the latter). On the other side, the Hillary Clinton point falls
somewhat below most of the other points. Based upon this evidence, the vertical dimension
seems to represent either general notoriety or an “insider-outsider” distinction. Once again,
external evidence can be used to validate this interpretation: Each figure’s status as a party
“insider” can be measured by taking the mean thermometer ratings provided by identifiers
with the same party (i.e., the mean rating by Democrats of Kerry, Nader, Edwards, the
Clintons, and the Democratic party itself; the mean rating by Republicans of Bush, Cheney,
McCain, Laura Bush, Ashcroft, Powell, and the Republican party). In the MDS configura-
tion, the difference between the vertical coordinates for each figure and the Democratic or
Republican party represents how “distant” each figure is from his/her party (of course, the
parties are maximally “close” to themselves, since this distance is zero in each case). The
correlation between the mean intra-party thermometer ratings and the vertical distances is
very large, at 0.839. Thus, along with ideology, people apparently judged the 2004 can-
didates according to whether they represent the mainstream of their respective parties or
stand as outsiders (for varying reasons).
9. An indirect effect is the change in the log odds of a Bush vote due to the impact of ideology
on another intervening variable that, in turn, affects vote choice directly (e.g., Fox 1980).
Assume that βˆj is the OLS coefficient showing the impact of ideology on variable Xj and
γˆj is the ML logistic regression coefficient showing the impact of Xj on vote choice. The
indirect effect of ideology on vote choice, operating through Xj, would be defined as the
product of these two coefficients, βˆj γˆj. Here, ideology operates through four intervening
variables: candidate evaluations, issue attitudes, sociotropic evaluations, and feelings about
the Iraq war. Using the coefficients from Tables 1 and 4, the indirect effects of ideology
through each of the preceding variables are 0.337, 0.206, 0.010, and 0.061, respectively. The
full indirect effect is obtained by summing the separate indirect effects; this produces the
value of 0.614 reported in the text. An odds ratio can be obtained for the indirect effect,
in the usual manner, by exponentiating the effect on the log odds. In this case, e0.614 = 1.848.
10. The difference between the indirect effect of ideology and the direct effect of party identifi-
cation on voting choice is not statistically significant. In fact, it is quite difficult to calculate
the standard error for the indirect effect of ideology, because the latter is defined as a nonlin-
ear combination of coefficients. However, even ignoring sampling variability in the indirect
effect, the probability value for a two-sided test of the null hypothesis that the direct impact
of party identification is equal to 0.614 is 0.386. This null hypothesis would not be rejected
at any standard level of statistical testing. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the
difference between the sizes of the two effects is due to sampling error.
11. Of course, the Democratic candidates and campaign themes varied across the two years.
And, while George W. Bush was a candidate in both cases, his incumbency-based appeals
to patriotism and national security concerns in the 2004 campaign were a marked shift from
the “compassionate conservatism” that dominated the earlier contest.
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Table 1: Logistic regression estimates showing the determinants of voting choice in the 2004
presidential election. The dependent variable is coded so that a Bush vote is one
and a Kerry vote is zero.
Maximum likelihood
coefficient estimate
(standard error Odds
in parentheses) ratio
Party 0.510 1.666
Identification (0.120)
Liberal-conservative 0.247 1.280
self-placement (0.188)
Candidate personality 2.041 7.698
trait assessments (0.327)
Summary issue 0.756 2.130
attitudes (0.259)
Sociotropic economic 0.575 1.777
judgments (0.259)
Feelings about 0.356 1.428
the Iraq war (0.151)
Constant −4.168
Pseudo-R2 0.778
Log likelihood −99.828
Number of observations 651
Note: Coefficients for all variables except liberal-conservative self-placement are statistically
significant at the 0.05 level (one-sided tests).
Data Source: 2004 CPS National Election Study.
Table 2: Logistic regression estimates from a conditional effects model of voting choice in
the 2004 presidential election. The dependent variable is coded so that a Bush vote
is one and a Kerry vote is zero. The impact of the first six independent variables
is hypothesized to be conditional upon the level of political knowledge.
Maximum likelihood Multiplicative term
coefficient estimate between variable and
(standard error knowledge scale (standard
in parentheses) error in parentheses
Party 0.724 −0.069
Identification (0.260) (0.077)
Liberal-conservative 0.264 0.002
self-placement (0.426) (0.126)
Candidate personality 1.908 0.067
trait assessments (0.678) (0.211)
Summary issue 0.815 0.006
attitudes (0.660) (0.176)
Sociotropic economic 1.035 −0.138
judgments (0.572) (0.164)
Feelings about −0.289 0.202
the Iraq war (0.360) (0.105)
Political −0.839
knowledge (0.913)
Constant −1.622
Pseudo-R2 0.785
Log likelihood −96.850
Number of observations 651
Note: For the first six variables, the coefficient in the left-hand column shows the effect
of that independent variable when the political knowledge variable is equal to zero.
For each of these variables, the coefficient in the right-hand column gives the change
in that variable’s impact on the vote that occurs with a single unit increase in the
political knowledge variable. None of the coefficients for the multiplicative terms are
statistically different from zero (two- sided test).
Data Source: 2004 CPS National Election Study.
Table 3: Citizen placements of 2004 candidates and parties along the liberal-conservative
scale.
Percentage placing at Percentage placing at
Percentage placing “correct” location “incorrect” location
along the liberal– along the liberal– along the liberal–
conservative scale conservative scale conservative scale
Candidates:
Bush 89.44 64.36 15.92
Kerry 89.77 59.08 12.95
Nader 64.69 40.02 9.57
Parties:
Democratic Party 90.51 60.56 14.19
Republican Party 90.02 66.01 13.94
Note: The number of observations used to calculate the percentages ranges from 784 to
1097.
Data Source: 2004 CPS National Election Study.
Table 4: The impact of party identification and liberal-conservative ideology on Bush-Kerry
personality assessments, issue attitudes, sociotropic economic judgments, and feel-
ings about the Iraq war.
Liberal–
Party conservative
identification self-placement Intercept R2
Bush-Kerry 0.370 0.165 -1.816 0.584
personality assessments (0.016) (0.023)
Issue 0.172 0.273 2.033 0.428
attitudes (0.015) (0.022)
Sociotropic economic 0.206 0.017 1.945 0.265
judgments (0.014) (0.021)
Feelings about 0.388 0.172 0.765 0.414
the Iraq war (0.023) (0.033)
Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients. Coefficients in the two left columns are all
statistically greater than zero (0.05 level) except for the impact of liberal-conservative
ideology on sociotropic economic judgments. The number of observations ranges from
907 to 914.
Data Source: 2004 CPS National Election Study.
Figure 1: Perceptual space for 2004 political figures and parties.
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Note: This configuration is obtained from a nonmetric multidimensional scaling analysis of
LOS dissimilarities. The latter are calculated from feeling thermometer ratings of the
stimuli given by the 2004 NES respondents. The scaling solution has a Stress1 value
of 0.04 and the correlation between the (optimally transformed) dissimilarities and
the scaled distances is 1.00.
